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Abstract 
Globalization, the technological interconnectedness of societies, and America’s military 
prowess have created the opportunity and motive for future peer competitors to exploit 
Unrestricted Warfare (URW) strategies.  This holistic approach to warfare employs coherent and 
integrated multidimensional actions, synchronized in time and space, combining all available 
means, including military and civilian, violent and non-lethal force, targeting adversary’s wide-
spectrum domains, aiming to affect opponent’s will and capabilities during times of real or 
perceived conflict. Shifting the emphasis from military to political, economic, information, and 
cultural engagements, future peer competitors will aim to constrain the US’s response within a 
regional or global sphere of interest, degrading its combat effectiveness, by collapsing 
government organizations, and disrupting the normal flow of society.  Such perspective produces 
several strategic implications, exposing legal and moral dilemmas, the increasing civilianization 
of war, and risk society challenges. 
The fact that warfare is expanding beyond the military domain continues to constrain 
Western thought, challenging military and political decision-makers.  Therefore, it demands a 
shift of mindset in order to understand that the main strategic differences towards warfare are 
cultural, and that warfare should be viewed as a holistic endeavor.  Hence, the importance of a 
coherent integration of US’s national security strategy.  This involves a three step approach 
based on renewed strategic thought, the purposeful adaptation leading to a holistic-agency 
approach, and a people-centric perspective enhancing the education of the national security 
practitioners. 
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Introduction 
It’s the end of war as we know it! Imagine a future scenario where an adversary devises a 
plan to strike the United States (US) using a holistic approach.  In the midst of a global economic 
meltdown, and avoiding direct military confrontation, the adversary unleashes a series of 
coordinated network attacks against critical infrastructures.  Several Trojan horses are activated 
creating havoc on air traffic control, nuclear power plants, electricity facilities, and financial 
markets, shutting down the country.  This chaotic environment creates the opportunity for ‘cyber 
moles’ to target sensitive corporate data, stealing valuable intellectual property.  Meanwhile, a 
fully-loaded oil tanker is hijacked by a private military company and sunk in the Gulf of Mexico 
creating an ecological catastrophe. Suddenly, several cases of viral infections are diagnosed as 
the outbreak of smallpox rapidly spreads around the country causing a biological epidemic.  In 
the meantime, several stories of food poisoning start circulating in the media increasing the 
population uproar. This farfetched scenario portrays a large-scale asymmetric attack on the US 
by an ambiguous peer competitor with the intent to paralyze society and cause social panic and 
unrest leading to a political crisis.  The peer competitor’s ultimate goal would be to constrain the 
US’s interests and freedom of action, on either a global or regional basis.1 
The prospect of a war-free world has its roots on the promises of technological advances that 
would render future combat obsolete.2  However, the question is not how technologically 
advanced a society is but what it does with that technology.  The lethality, precision, and global 
reach of the American way of war has changed the modern character of warfare, allowing the US 
to fight wars with fewer casualties.  This trend has created a military asymmetry which expresses 
the limited effectiveness of conventional warfare against the overwhelming conventional power 
of American military forces. 
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Such a framework unveils a fundamental problem, which underlines this research.  Given 
the tendency of the US to pursue the hi-tech approach to warfare and the effects of future trend 
drivers such as globalization and technology, what strategy can a peer competitor develop to 
compensate for military inferiority to the US?  Furthermore, it is an assumption of this study that 
the rise of a peer competitor will not be peaceful, and it will bring severe consequences to the 
security of the US.  This dilemma spurs several derived questions which will stimulate and guide 
this research.  What are the drivers of future warfare and how will they interact with the 
American way of war to create opportunities for a future peer competitor?  What are the 
principles, dynamics, dilemmas, and strategic utility of such strategy?  What are the implications 
for the US and the future of warfare?  What can the US do about it? 
Bounded by such a framework, this research will argue that future adversaries of the US will 
utilize Unrestricted Warfare (URW) strategies in order to avoid direct confrontation with US 
military forces.  The URW strategies utilized will leverage all state instruments of power and 
warfare will not be restricted to just military targets.  Overall, this holistic strategy will be a 
viable tool to accomplish national security objectives when a weaker state confronts a more 
powerful state.3  Ten years have passed since the concept of URW was initially introduced by 
two Chinese Colonels.4  Instead of “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s 
will,” they envisioned future warfare as a holistic approach reflecting the employment of “all 
means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non­
lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests.”5  Since then, several events have 
provided sufficient insights to suggest the prospective character of this theory of warfare as a 
cornerstone for future interstate conflict. On the other hand, recent conflicts have revealed some 
of the military and political weaknesses of the American way of war.6  Exploiting those 
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weaknesses will be the main focus of future strategies available to peer competitors of the US.  
Will America be ready? 
The problem-solution methodology will guide the research effort.  In order to establish a 
structured way to collect and analyze information, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats (SWOT) analysis will be introduced as a strategic planning tool to evaluate the proposed 
solution.7  This activity is designed to exercise proactive thinking, thus improving the 
understanding, discussion, and decision-making process.  This paper will frame the problem by 
exploring the tendencies of the American way of war and investigating the effects of global 
trends, with the purpose of discovering the strategic opportunities for the rise of URW.  
Afterwards, it will establish the conceptual foundations of URW, describing its origins, 
characteristics, and impact, using a reasoning pattern to predict some of its implications.  Finally, 
it will offer some prescriptive recommendations. 
Framing the Problem: Exploring the Drivers of Future Warfare 
The New American Way of War 
Investigating the traits of America’s current approach to combat provides a framework to 
understand its future behavior. It also exposes some of the continuities and tendencies that can 
be exploited by future adversaries. The discussion evolves within several trends such as the 
pursuit for decisiveness of the military instrument; the centrality of technology as a solution to 
the strategic problems; the growing cost of warfare; the casualty aversion; and the tendency to 
wage war as an autonomous endeavor. 
The quest for decisive battles, relying on a maneuver and firepower approach with emphasis 
on technology has been the hallmark of the American way of war.  The seminal work of Russell 
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Weigley establishes the historical patterns of the American way of war as defaulting to a strategy 
of annihilation, which seeks to overthrow the enemy’s military power mainly through 
conventional battles.8  Others debate this aspiration for annihilation, claiming that throughout its 
history the US has favored attrition strategies.9  Reflecting on the tradition of fighting small wars 
and insurgencies, Max Boot broadens this scope arguing for a new American way of war.  One 
that avoids bloody matches and seeks victory in a quicker and safer way, through speed, 
maneuver, flexibility, and surprise.10  Giving as an example the invasion of Iraq, he unveils the 
role of information technology, precision firepower, Special Forces, psychological operations, 
and jointness. Steven Metz confirms the importance of speed, knowledge, and precision in 
reducing casualties and leading to the rapid resolution of wars.11  However, in recent years, he 
has acknowledged that these qualities were not enough to provide a quick strategic success.12 
The pursuit of a technological solution to the strategic challenges is deeply enrooted in the 
American way of war.13  In part because the fascination with technology assumes it will dictate 
the character of future warfare.14  Thomas Mahnken confirms the overwhelming advantage of the 
US’s technological edge over friend and foe alike.15  Technological innovation played a decisive 
role during World War II, providing also the qualitative advantage over the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War.  This trend was reinforced in recent conflicts where increased lethality, precision, 
and global reach have highlighted the promises of technology.  In reality, technological 
superiority may have become a disadvantage by creating the perception that wars are clean, safe 
and acceptable.16  It is a fact that technological advances introduce asymmetries on the 
battlefield.17  Unfortunately, where one sees strengths others see weaknesses.  These advantages 
have always been temporary and rapidly equalized, either by new technologies or fighting 
tactics.18  For example, during Vietnam, in order to negate American technological supremacy, 
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the adversary shifted the battlefield to complex environments, such as urban, jungle or 
mountains.19  Again, history repeats itself in recent conflicts, where potential adversaries are not 
hampered by bureaucracy and can fully exploit commercial technology.20  Armed with a 
computer, modem, and a stolen credit card, any enemy is only bounded by their imagination.21 
Hence, this machine mindedness, as expressed by Colin Gray, exposes past, present, and future 
trends of American warfare.22 
Directly related with the technological prowess is the claim that America has often won its 
wars by outspending its adversaries.23  Because the US has chosen to be strong in every sphere of 
combat, in every type of warfare, and in every corner of the globe, it faces pressure to invest and 
innovate in many different fields at once.24  This ambition comes with a price tag. For example, 
in 2007 the amount of the US’s military budget was higher than at any time since World War 
II.25  However, due to the growth of the US economy, the burden of military spending is lower 
when compared with the peak spending years of the Cold War.26  Yet, the costs associated with 
the American way of war may seem acceptable because of its precision, lethality, and reduced 
casualties. Although the cost per weapon has increased, the promise of improved efficiency with 
fewer personnel and equipment makes it a political instrument of choice.27  Nevertheless, the 
competition for funds, the escalating costs of weapon systems programs, the delays in the 
development and the replacement of legacy systems pose additional constraints to the defense 
budget, either by reducing the number of systems produced, or by accepting less operational 
capability than expected while extending the production timeline.28 
Another main theme of the American way of war is the aversion to casualties, both friendly 
and collateral. The reasons for this are twofold.  First, it reflects the trend of risk-averse 
societies, where small families lacking expendable children have lower tolerance for casualties.29 
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Second, it is a consequence of the improved precision and lethality of the American way of war, 
creating the expectations for a casualty-free warfare.30  These trends diminish the likelihood that 
advanced societies will deliberately set out to fight one another unless they can be convinced that 
war can be waged with fewer soldiers.31  Some may see this as a weakness worth exploiting.  For 
example, the US intervention in Somalia revealed an extremely cautious approach to the use of 
force, giving the insurgents the opportunity to exploit the American casualty-aversion as a 
weakness. Nonetheless, this casualty sensitivity must be seen in context.  Whenever society 
perceives that vital interests are at risk it will be more permissive of casualties.  Historical 
examples of World War II and the initial response after 9/11 support this claim.  Nevertheless, 
the expectation for a quick and decisive victory, although seldom real, is an image that many 
Americans want and expect.32  Hence, in an era of the 24 hours news cycle coupled with a 
strategic nearsightedness of a democratic regime, which is captive to electoral cycles, it becomes 
difficult to lead and justify a long war unless there is a clear and present danger.33 
Several authors are inclined to agree with Antulio Echevarria’s argument that the American 
way of warfare reflects a symptomatic military approach that concentrates on winning battles 
instead of wars.34  Wielding military power autonomously from other instruments of power is a 
consequence of different spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy and one for combat.35 
Colin Gray reinforces these trends in his analysis about the American way of war, suggesting the 
need for additional efforts thinking about the capabilities needed to turn combat successes into 
favorable strategic outcomes.36  These lessons are painfully expressed throughout history, 
revealing some of the weaknesses of the American way of war when confronted with 
unconventional methods of warfare.37 
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Glimpses of Tomorrow 
Exploring future trends and its drivers provides insights that will be helpful to frame the 
research problem.  Having in mind the complexity, and sometimes the impossibility, of 
predicting the future, the following discussion addresses the emergence of a multipolar future 
and the shift of the US’s hegemony.  The interaction of globalization and technology diffusion 
will impact warfare’s diversity, affordability, and effectiveness.  Further analysis reveals the 
potential for interstate conflicts as a result of geopolitical rivalry, within a resources constrained, 
over-populated world, facing an environmental crisis. 
Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World is the most current study released by the 
National Intelligence Council.38  The major assumption in this report is that the emergence of a 
multipolar future brings dramatic changes to the international system.39  Greater diffusion of 
authority and power could occur, creating a global governance deficit.40  This is also the opinion 
of several authors which assert the shift of US hegemony.41  Not necessarily due to American 
decline but rather due to the rise of other powers.  The rise of China, European Union, Brazil, 
Russia, and India will increase the clashes over states interests.  Additionally, the predicted 
reduction of effectiveness of international institutions could narrow the scope of the US’s policy 
options.42  Although still possessing military superiority, in 2025 the US could be confronted by 
asymmetrical strategies, trying to exploit military and political vulnerabilities, with the objective 
to constrain the US’s freedom of action in time of crisis.43 
Globalization remains the pervasive meta-trend which may reorder “current divisions based 
on geography, ethnicity, and religious and socio-economic status.”44  Additionally, globalization 
could continue to ensure the diffusion and affordability of technology, which would facilitate the 
disruption of advanced societies. The trend of technological diffusion, both in proliferation and 
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reduced cost, could then allow what Dennis Bushnell calls “warfare on the cheap,” ensuring that 
any nation or sizable organization can achieve a very worrisome military peer status.45 
Therefore, in the future, technology could improve warfare’s affordability and effectiveness.  
During most of the twentieth century, military technology outpaced civilian technology, but with 
the arrival of the information age that trend has reversed.46  Today, industry is the largest source 
of research and development (R&D) funding.47  In the future, the continuing trend of shifting 
investment in technology R&D, from the government to the private sector, may increase the 
dependency of the military on commercial technologies and services.  On the other hand, it could 
make those technologies readily available to possible adversaries.  For illustration, the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles by Hezbollah during the war in Lebanon in 2006 indicates such 
proliferation of new technology. Peter Singer illustrates these challenges by questioning the 
implications of the US fighting wars with hardware made in China and software made in India.48 
Thomas Friedman’s synthesis of the future as “hot, flat, and crowded,” reveals the combined 
trends of global warming, the rise of the middle classes, and rapid population growth.49  His 
analysis reveals a strong possibility that the future might bring a dangerous combination of 
geopolitical rivalry and environmental crisis.  Likewise, the access to resources might pose a 
renewed emphasis on geography and geopolitics. For instance, the current tug-of-war over 
Arctic resources may turn out to be the most important territorial dispute of this century with 
severe consequences to the environment.50  Along with the comparative erosion of the US’s 
hegemonic position emerges the menace of state confrontation reminding the persistent historic 
motives for war: “fear, honor, and interest.”51 
In 2025, warfare is expected to be characterized by the increasing importance of 
information; the evolution of irregular warfare capabilities; the prominence of the non-military 
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aspects of warfare; and the expansion and escalation of conflicts beyond the traditional 
battlefield.52  Additionally, the current emphasis on non-state threats and actors extends to future 
conflicts. There are authors who even dismiss decisive wars between major states, 
characterizing the future security environment as filled with minor conflicts.53  However, the 
main reason that major interstate wars are “enjoying an off-season” is that the imbalance of 
military power is so great towards the US that potential rivals avoid upsetting the superpower.54 
Nevertheless, this assumption does not mean that adversaries will resign from competing with 
the US. It means that they will be more innovative when challenging US’s hegemony.  Hence, 
the next sections will discuss a possible answer to the research problem.  A holistic approach 
encapsulated by the concept of URW. 
The Art and Science of Unrestricted Warfare 
The previous section discussed the drivers of future warfare and how they would interact 
with the American way of war to create opportunities for a future peer competitor.  Having 
established the prowess of US’s conventional military power, and the probability for a future 
conflict between the US and an emergent peer competitor, this section will seek to answer the 
following problem:  What are the conceptual foundations, dynamics, and dilemmas of such a 
strategy?  Answering this question should unveil the strengths and weaknesses of URW. 
Conceptual Foundations 
Sun Tzu asserted that, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”55 
However, the idealized vision of subduing the enemy without battle is not, according to Ian 
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Johnston, the prevailing theme of the Chinese strategic culture.56  Conflict may actually be 
preferred on some occasions.  It all depends on the priorities and objectives. 
The conceptual foundations of URW strategy follow this principle of “absolute flexibility” 
or quan bian, where the “not fighting approach” is just one of the panoply of methods available.  
Also, the notion of quan bian lifts the political, military, or moral constraints that may hinder the 
strategic choices, allowing the selection of “any and all actions that will achieve one’s goals.”57 
Establishing a simple but comprehensive definition of URW is the starting point for 
discussion. However, probing the literature indicates that trying to define URW may become a 
conceptual quagmire.  Several scholars characterize future warfare as a mix of methods and 
actors, adding more complexity to the current warfare taxonomy.  Arguments for Irregular 
Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Fluid Conflicts, Fourth Generation Warfare, and Hybrid 
Warfare are scattered in the literature.58  Since URW is not a doctrinally defined term in the US, 
it has a pervasive definition, meaning different things to different people and organizations.  
Some relate this kind of conflict with the impact on American values, violating Western cultural 
sensitivities and norms.  This view exposed by Ronald Luman relates URW to a conflict in 
which the enemy takes actions that cause shock and fear, offend, and even generate disbelief in 
the American mind.59  More commonly, URW has been identified as asymmetric warfare.60 
However, the concept of URW is broader than just an asymmetry in military capabilities, 
reflecting rather an idiosyncrasy since it reveals an unorthodox approach or means of applying a 
capability, which doesn’t follow the rules.61  Such strategy broadens the boundaries, instruments, 
and actors of war, making power projection more affordable, coercive, and lethal.  This is 
particularly important to contemporary societies, deeply integrated and dependent on technology, 
making them very susceptible to idiosyncratic attacks.62 
10 
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According to its original proponents, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, URW 
employs “all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and 
lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”63  This study 
borrows Liang and Xiangsui’s perspective, but seeks to complement their concept using 
contemporary lenses.  Therefore, it aims to provide a working definition which reflects the 
unique characteristics and essence of the URW concept focusing the discussion on the 
perspective of a future peer competitor.  This can be done by organizing the ideas of its original 
proponents with the strategy’s framework of ways, means, and ends.  In short, strategy aims to 
answer how to use power to achieve objectives.64  Hence, URW encompasses the use of 
unrestricted measures, applying all available instruments, to achieve limited objectives.   
Considering all these arguments, this study will define URW as a holistic strategy which 
employs coherent and integrated multidimensional actions, synchronized in time and space, 
combining all available means, including military and civilian, violent and non-lethal force, 
targeting adversary’s wide-spectrum domains, aiming to affect the opponent’s will and 
capabilities during times of real or perceived conflict.  Clausewitz has warned us that war tends 
towards extremes and URW is the best example of pushing a combinatory game to the edges.65 
It simultaneously changes the warfare concept and the role of the combatant.  Informed by the 
URW definition and its strategic uniqueness, it’s now time to probe and explain its dynamics and 
strategic principles, unveiling its strengths. 
Dynamics and Strategic Principles 
In order to understand the strengths of URW some fundamental questions need to be 
answered. Why fight and for whom?  Where to fight?  Who fights?  What is targeted?  What 
11 
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means and methods are used?  Exploring these questions will unveil the URW strategic 
principles as a set of interrelated features such as the aims and allegiances of the belligerents; the 
battlefield ubiquity; the rise of super-empowered individuals; the expanded target sets; and the 
fluid operational methods and weapons. 
Aims and Allegiance of the Belligerents.  Although religion and culture will continue to be 
major sources of conflict, war will be primarily waged as a political event, with self-interest the 
ultimate motive.  Within this framework, URW strategy emerges as a rational activity which 
seeks an advantage over a superior adversary.  Therefore, instead of seeking unlimited 
objectives, the peer competitor’s ultimate goal would be to constrain the US’s response within a 
regional or global sphere of interest.  Achieving such an end state would be facilitated if the US 
had to prepare against all possible attacks or operate simultaneously on several fronts, thus 
splitting its forces and increasing its vulnerability to attacks.  Considering the rise of a peer 
competitor, the notion of “threat kingdom actor” expresses the most dangerous potential 
opponent, able to engage across the entire spectrum of conflict in time, space, intensity, and 
instruments of power.66  Robert Bunker shares this opinion, confirming that this innovative 
ability of matching the best threat with the most suitable means available, whilst wielding other 
than military methods, makes URW, as a nation-state grand strategy, such a formidable threat. 67 
Battlefield Ubiquity. Technology has enabled a double transformation in war’s battlefield.  
It allowed both a vertical and lateral expansion.  Until the twentieth century, the battlefield was 
confined.  Then, airplanes allowed the military to circumvent the static battlefield adding a third 
dimension to the fight.  However, information technologies moved the battlefield laterally, 
creating a technological space (the cyberspace), expanding into “non-physical” domains and 
allowing influence and disruption of the conventional space without occupying it.68  Current 
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conflicts are showing an increasing tendency to expand the battlefields from the physical domain 
into informational, cognitive, and social domains, affecting politics, economics, culture, and 
people’s minds.  In the future, nanotechnologies will augment the current bio-chemical 
capabilities, moving the battlefield into a microscopic arena.  As seen before, the traditional 
American way of war seeks primarily a military victory on the battlefield.  Conversely, the URW 
strategy aims to achieve victories beyond the military battlefield, striking at the heart of Western 
society’s values in order to shape public opinion and influence events.69  When adversaries 
camouflage within civilians, exposing them to casualties from air attacks, they exploit the effects 
of collateral damage through global media, seeking to gain support for their cause.70  Conflicts of 
this nature reveal the polymorphous and omnidirectional nature of future battlefields, where 
fighting will take place simultaneously in macroscopic, mesoscopic, and microscopic spheres.71 
The Super-empowered Individual. Within the URW construct the military has lost the 
monopoly of force. This is not new, however the novelty resides in the fact that the boundaries 
between professional soldiers and non-combatants is becoming more diluted.  Worst than that, 
military forces are ill suited to be successful in this new strategic arena because traditional 
military forces are not well prepared to engage beyond the military domain.72  In this new arena, 
the super-empowered individual, being a software engineer, scientist, a financier, or even suicide 
bomber, has the capability to affect and possibly disrupt a nation-state.  The reach and scale of 
their strategic impact extends to all domains of human interaction.  They are able to establish ties 
with other individuals, organizations, and states.  These interest alliances are flux variables, 
rapidly emerging and dissolving, changing the face of the enemy.  The leverage provided by 
their knowledge and anonymity improves their freedom of action and survival capability, making 
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them high value assets in future conflicts.  Hence, coordinating a force of super-empowered 
individuals, under specific commanders’ intent, will be the ultimate goal of a peer competitor.    
Expanded Target Sets. Every strategy seeks to target the adversary’s vulnerabilities.  In a 
complex environment, such as American society, there are several weaknesses that are worth 
exploring. The interconnected economy, critical infrastructure, society, and media, all have 
vulnerabilities. The political decision-making process is complex and requires consensus.  The 
limitations imposed by the laws of conflict hinder the application of military force.  The need for 
international cooperation allows for lengthy debates obstructing effective and timely responses.  
The pervasive nature of the media transforms a tactical event into strategic effects.  The 
impossibility of guaranteeing total security creates anxiety and uncertainty.  This is the nature of 
a modern liberal democracy.73  Therefore, explicitly targeting civilians and supporting 
infrastructure, reflects the emphasis to destroy the Western state’s center of gravity: its liberal 
values.74 Targeting critical infrastructures allows the disruption of quotidian activities, instilling 
fear in the population, and inflicting severe economic costs, both on the protection of key assets 
and on its reconstruction.75  Targeting living organisms, such as crops, cattle, and the people 
takes the fear threshold to whole new levels.  Again, this is not new. History has shown the 
tendency to target civilians using punishment strategies in order to coerce a political change.76 
However, the preferred instrument of power to inflict such harm has always been the military.  
On the contrary, URW leverages on the global interconnectedness and technological advances to 
maximize its effects over the population, mixing and matching military with non-military 
methods, prescribing a multidimensional approach using ‘new concepts of weapons.’ 
Fluid Operational Methods and ‘New Concepts of Weapons.’  Most conflicts in history 
have been waged as a combination of methods of warfare, but the main effort occurred within 
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the military domain.  The following table encompasses some of the forms of warfare which are 
possible within the URW strategy (each form of warfare is described in Appendix 1).   
Table 1. Examples of Unrestricted Warfare Methods 
Military Trans-military Non-military 
Atomic Warfare Diplomatic Warfare Financial Warfare 
Conventional Warfare Network Warfare Trade Warfare 
Bio-chemical Warfare Intelligence Warfare Resources Warfare 
Ecological Warfare Psycological Warfare Economic Aid Warfare 
Space Warfare Smuggling Warfare  Regulatory Warfare 
Electronic Warfare Drug Warfare Media Warfare 
Guerrilla Warfare Ideological Warfare 
Terrorist Warfare 
Source: Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare, 38-43,123. 
Although most forms of warfare have existed for centuries, due to global interconnectedness 
and technological advances, their impact over society has exponentially grown.  Also, the major 
difference lies at the intellectual level.  Instead of simply combining and adding forms of 
warfare, URW strategy aims for simultaneity in order to achieve a final outcome which is greater 
than the sum of its parts. This requires holistic thinking which is cross-level (tactical, 
operational, strategic); cross-domain (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace); and cross-
dimension (military, trans-military, and non-military).  The principle of combination or addition 
seeks to mix and match different actors, ways, means, and stages in order to achieve limited 
objectives.77  Combining national, international, non-state organizations, and even individual 
actors, provides the essential leverage to achieve the national security objectives.  
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Thinking synergistically also applies to a diverse array of weapons.  It’s expressed by the 
dichotomy between “making the weapons that fit the fight,” and “fight the fight that fits the 
weapons.”78  While the former idea relies on technological advances, and reflects the traditional 
way of warfare where the superior fights the inferior, the latter allows the mix and match of 
capabilities, seeking the optimum tactics for the weapons one has.79  Inseparable from the 
previous dichotomy are the contradictory qualities of ‘weapons of new concepts’ and ‘new 
concepts of weapons.’80  The former are the hallmark of the American way of war, and have 
increased precision and lethality, but are expensive and can only be used by professional soldiers 
on specific battlefields.  The latter concept “views as weapons all means which transcend the 
military realm but which can still be used in combat operations”81  They are more affordable, 
readily available, and have wider disrupting effects, ranging from stock market crashes, 
computer viruses, and rumors or scandals that affect currency exchange rates.82  The epitome of 
such concept was revealed during the 9/11 attacks, where non-military means and ways were 
employed to achieve political objectives.  Thus, this perspective reveals the shift from a 
technology-centric mindset to the importance of intellect and strategy. 
The trend of technological diffusion, the increasing practice of outsourcing, and the reliance 
on commercial off-the-shelf products, all facilitate the creation and employment of ‘new 
concepts of weapons.’83  The future availability and affordability of dual use technologies, such 
as directed energy, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, will provide additional means to impose 
fear and uncertainty. A parallelism may be found between such ‘new concept of weapons’ and 
some Chinese capabilities referred to as ‘Assassin’s Mace Programs.’  These weapons or tactics 
are viewed as a ‘silver bullet’ which would render any adversary response useless.  In the end, 
they will function as psychological instruments to create more uncertainty and anxiety.  For 
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example, some of the non-military methods may produce strategic effects similar to the use of 
nuclear weapons but without the political risks of crossing the nuclear threshold.84 
Edwin Lowe condenses the URW perspective about conflict in one word: “totality.”85  This 
is the most distinguishable strength of URW because, instead of mobilizing all society to support 
the military effort, it expands warfare beyond the military domain.  Therefore, its holistic and 
synergistic view of conflict, as a function of statecraft, contrasts with the compartmentalized and 
categorized, scientific approach of the West.86  Nonetheless, there are several challenges which 
may hinder the effectiveness of the URW strategy. 
From Promise to Reality 
The translation of a strategic concept to reality can unveil possible weaknesses and 
dilemmas.  Therefore, it is important to assess the strategy suitability (will it achieve the effects 
desired?), feasibility (can the actions be accomplished by the means available?), and 
acceptability (are the methods, resources, and the effects justifiable?), to determine the validity 
and risk of such a strategy.87 
At the conceptual level, the proliferation of different perspectives about URW doesn’t 
facilitate its understanding, thus making its operationalization a complex task.  Additionally, the 
negative connotation of URW, as opposing the rules of war, renders it difficult to translate into 
doctrine and execution. Perhaps this could be the reason why some authors address the URW 
concept under a different name, in an attempt to make it more appealing as a strategy.88 
Although it has been identified as one of the four current Chinese schools of military thought, 
there is no express indication that an URW strategy is being employed in a holistic manner or as 
an official doctrine by any nation-state.89  Yet, there are signs of embryonic stages of URW 
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strategy, reflecting scattered actions and probing efforts in several domains.  For example, after 
the collision of a US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter plane, in 2001, several hackers 
defaced dozens of US military Web sites.90  Another URW-like event links pro-Russian 
computer hackers with cyber attacks against Estonia, Lithuania, and Georgia through incidents 
connected to political friction between those nations and Russia.91  Further network probing 
activities cannot be officially attributed to a nation, but there are some suspicions that they can 
be traced back to China.92  Other incidents were also linked to China, acknowledging the 
development of disrupt technologies such as anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare.93 
These examples portray URW, as mentioned by Steven Metz, as a ‘proto-concept’ rather 
than a mature one.94  Nonetheless, he acknowledges the fact that the URW approach posits a true 
strategic revolution because it provides a conceptual approach that is being partially employed 
against the US, providing valuable lessons to future peer competitor strategies. 
The unlimited nature of battlefields and the expertise required to be effective on those 
domains pose additional constraints on the strategist.  Although in the past this was not strange to 
the military strategist, URW stretches the operational art to new levels, domains, and 
dimensions, challenging the orthodoxy of Western thinkers.  Therefore, orchestrating an 
effective holistic strategy will shift the emphasis from science to the art of war, creating 
additional problems regarding the education and training of future professional warriors.   
The premises of URW, traceable from ancient Chinese experience, require secrecy, surprise, 
denial, and deception in order to create maximum impact.  Although secrecy has always been 
inherent to warfare preparations, URW raises this principle to the grand strategic level, allowing 
its proponent to wage operations against an adversary without their awareness that a conflict is 
underway, thus limiting their responses.  Therefore, secrecy is vital for the success of a long-term 
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strategy. Moreover, concealing strategic intentions protects a country from the eventuality of a 
preventive strike. However, this purposeful uncertainty of strategic intentions conflicts with the 
demands of transparency and the free flow of information within the integrated global 
economy.95  Hence, the potential for others to misunderstand such strategic intentions will 
increase. Due to the target’s nature, the methods employed, and the impact of its effects, those 
actions can be viewed as an act of war.96 
Likewise, peer competitors may overestimate the promises of URW compelling them to 
engage in offensive operations, misjudging the effects of their decisions on the security 
perceptions and responses of the adversary.97  An effective strategy must consider war as a duel, 
thus taking into account the response of the adversary.  For example, the underestimation about 
the US resolve to endure casualties may also contribute to a conflict escalation, leading to an 
American ‘unrestricted’ response even risking the crossing of the nuclear threshold.  Conversely, 
9/11 has raised the US’s awareness about its vulnerabilities, which in turn has increased the risks 
for an adversary willing to wage URW. 
The previous examples highlight the complexity of employing a holistic URW strategy.  
Determining which measures to apply, and above all, what effects will be produced, is a difficult 
task. This would require a whole of government approach, making it hard to synchronize.  This 
ability to increase chaos beyond the military domain raises problems regarding the decision-
making process.  Since the dawn of time man has tried to decrease the fog and friction of 
conflict, searching for certainty in warfare.  However, forecasting strategic effects, in particular 
the second and third order effects is impossible.98  That would require an unachievable level of 
predictability and knowledge of the enemy, and the reactions of complex systems.  Hence, this 
will never be a perfect science.99 
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The discussion has submitted the URW concept to a litmus test revealing several challenges 
in its suitability, acceptability, and feasibility.  Within a peer competitor framework, having 
something at stake, such as territory, population or economic interests, coupled with the 
possibility of conflict escalation, and the complexity of orchestrating operations, may prevent the 
holistic employment of URW.  However, from an adversary’s perspective, URW as a risk-taking 
strategy presents an effective approach because it provides the means and ways to target the 
US’s vulnerabilities. Although in embryonic stages and charged with a negative connotation, it 
serves its ends as an effective strategy to fight wars in a world of risk societies.  Further, if 
applied in a holistic manner, considering limited objectives, its strengths and strategic effects 
could surmount its weaknesses and challenges.  Finally, the availability of means and 
multidimensional methods, although with complex orchestration, provide a framework to 
unleash the power of URW.  Considering the opportunities, strengths, and dilemmas of URW it’s 
now possible to foresee, more clearly, some of its implications for the future of warfare. 
Strategic Implications of Unrestricted Warfare 
URW cannot provide the only answer to wage future warfare.  Nevertheless, it provides a 
framework and capability for a peer competitor to confront the US in a holistic manner.  By 
exploring the strategic implications of URW it is possible to exercise ‘beyond-the-box’ thinking 
about future warfare. Although these implications are intertwined, this study will concentrate the 
analysis under a template of legal and moral dilemmas, civilianization of war, and risk society 
challenges. This analysis will support the need for a change in mindset. 
Legal and Moral Dilemmas 
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The legal framework that oversees warfare has increasingly narrowed the acceptable 
measures with which to wield the military instrument of national power.  The Geneva and Haig 
Conventions, the United Nations Charter and Resolutions, and many domestic laws, all bound 
modern warfare. Although war has become a less recurrent political method to solve disputes, it 
has become a more complex endeavor, highly restricted by Rules of Engagement and the 
increasing legal scrutiny of targets in order to minimize collateral damage.  Public and 
international support depends on the ability to win wars while reducing casualties.  This trend in 
modern warfare indicates a possible transformation of war into the “continuation of law by other 
means.”100  However, due to its multidimensional nature URW challenges this legal construct, 
raising difficult questions such as what can be regarded as an act of war in a non-military 
domain?  For example, would trade warfare or media warfare be considered an act of war?  How 
about overloading a server in order to cause it to shutdown?  On the other hand, will international 
law be discarded by a state employing URW?  Will future war be fought in a legal vacuum or 
will the international system adapt?  In the long run, the conduct of war without conventions is 
impossible, and thus a new framework will emerge to define who is allowed to kill whom, for 
what ends, under what circumstances, and by what means.101  History is fertile on such 
examples.  The twentieth century may have forbidden soldiers to loot and rape, but allowed the 
destruction of whole cities from the air.102 
Civilianization of War 
Can the nation-state adjust to the prospect of URW?  As seen before, state actors no longer 
have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence.  The civilianization of warfare is a 
natural consequence of URW, and the democratization of violence allows virtually everyone to 
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join the fight with ever growing capabilities and effects.  Shifting the fight to areas other than 
military battlefields will empower a new kind of warrior.  This will pose additional constraints 
on the nation-state in order to command and control such individuals (hackers, financial 
speculators, or multinational companies).  Additionally, the use of Private Military Companies 
(PMC) provides further leverage for a state to impose its will.103  The innovative employment of 
PMCs to offset the legal constraints on the use of force, allows the sponsor state to fulfill its 
interests without being accountable for the actions of such armed companies.104  The use of force 
by a nation-state is well regulated.  If a country decides to deploy armed forces to provide 
Foreign Internal Defense to a third country, it will face some scrutiny from the international 
community. However, the same doesn’t apply to a PMC.  In fact, when a Chinese company 
signed a contract to supply defense contractors to Angola in exchange for an oil agreement, there 
was no international repercussion.105  Perhaps, this reflects the increasing trend of state use of 
PMCs in modern conflicts, Iraq being one of the highest exponents.106  Using private and multi­
national corporations as instruments of warfare seems to indicate an increasing outsourcing of 
warfare. This trend will likely grow as a direct result of the expansion of the battlefields.  Hence, 
PMCs may function both as an URW enabler as well as ‘less regulated’ instruments to counter 
URW adversaries. Although states will continue to be the basis of international order, these 
tendencies will increase the blurring between war and crime as well as the difference between 
armed forces and civilians.  Hence, as Van Creveld has observed, “often, crime will be disguised 
as war, whereas in other cases war itself will be treated as if waging it were a crime.”107 
Living in a Risk Society 
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The perception that technology and globalization have transformed the magnitude of risks 
which affect contemporary societies is a central theme of social studies.108  From global warming 
to the way to wage war, advanced societies strive to anticipate future catastrophes which in turn 
influence their decision-making process.  Given the diverse areas of conflict encapsulated by 
URW, then the challenges facing the technology community in countering such wide array of 
methods and weapons are immense.109  The introduction of new technologies in warfare, such as 
genomics and nanotechnology, will further diversify the methods of attack, increasing the 
possibility for bioviolence. Barry Kellman alerts that the destruction of living organisms, unlike 
nuclear or traditional warfare, can be executed quietly and anonymously, making its prevention 
even more challenging.110  Therefore, preventing adversaries from sowing fear and uncertainty in 
a complex society is a daunting task.  The number of casualties from the 9/11 attacks were 
relatively low if compared with the effects of fear and uncertainty in public opinion that they 
motivated. Likewise, attacking critical infrastructure such as an airport or a water supply system 
might cause reduced casualties.  However, the prospect of insecurity, distrust, and uncertainty 
would generate ripple effects which could spread to other quotidian activities.  The panic caused 
by the employment of a weapon can be as harmful as the physical destruction.  This effect of 
psychological nullification, as Max Boot describes it, is likely to diminish upon future 
engagements of the same weapon.111  Nonetheless, URW induces an emergence of a new 
paradox. While the West continues to narrow its view of warfare’s acceptable parameters, the 
adversary amplifies the concept of total war.112 
Since URW challenges the defense, and preventive measures are unable to protect from 
every imaginable risk, then the answer is learning to live with risks.  Moreover, risk is a scenario 
followed by a strategy on how to prevent it.113  However, quantifying risks has become 
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extremely difficult, making it harder to rally public support for the use of military force.114 
Therefore, the main implication facing the US is how to psychologically prepare for and actively 
counter URW. On the other hand, the increasing need for security may eventually lead to the 
willingness of future societies to trade their civil liberties for their physical and psychological 
protection.115  In the end, successfully countering URW will require the American people to 
perceive such risks as exceptional events that don’t require extensive changes in their way of 
living.116  Achieving this threshold requires increasing the US’s resilience to URW.  Therefore, 
reducing the cascading effects of a target’s disruption would provide a degree of deterrence 
against possible attacks. However, it’s impossible to achieve complete security.  First, there 
aren’t enough resources to protect all the critical targets.  Second, the ambiguity of the threat 
makes it hard to locate, monitor, and respond.  For example, there is a wide-spread belief that 
intelligence gathering operations against the US are being conducted.  These state-sponsored 
probing activities engage in political, military, industrial, economic, and technical espionage.117 
However, the state’s responsibility for individual actions is often disowned.  According to 
McAffee, the world’s largest dedicated security technology company, there is a considerable 
misdirection as to the origins of the cyber attacks.118  Many cyber attacks are just as likely to 
originate in the same city as the target.  Those obfuscation activities render it difficult to attribute 
the responsibility for the origin and sponsor of the attacks.  Hence, although technology may 
provide additional surveillance and tracking capabilities, the ambiguity of URW actions hinders 
deterrence, retaliation, and proportional response.   
Exacerbating this trend is the perception of what may be an indirect attack by a major 
trading partner. Robert Bunker highlights this ‘perceptional trauma’ which causes immense 
detrimental effects on US views and analysis about China’s foreign policy.119  Although there are 
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always alternative and more benign explanations, Max Boot confirms this uncertainty about the 
strategic intentions which makes every adversary’s action a possible indication that URW 
strategy is being implemented.120 
The alignment of the previous implications exposes the fundamental strategic challenge of 
URW: the need for a shift of mindset in order to understand that the main strategic differences 
towards warfare are cultural.  Hence, viewing the adversary under the Industrial Age’s lens, 
purely in technological terms or number of weapon systems, misses the strengths of URW.  The 
adversary does not need to destroy the US’s military forces in order to win.  It can achieve 
victory if able to impose sufficient political and social constraints. Therefore, understanding 
warfare as a holistic endeavor is the essential first step.  Integrating national power beyond the 
military domain appears to be the logical next step.  Engaging the society in a collective effort 
and providing a new institutional framework which increases the resilience to URW actions 
could be a possible answer. But the main question still remains: how to do that?  The next 
section, as the corollary of this study, provides some suggestions on how to address this problem.   
Recommendations 
By now, the reader may be questioning how to craft a response to an indirect aggression in a 
globalized and technologically advanced world. This is not a simple task.  Quantifying the 
military threat is fairly easy, but measuring an adversary’s intent and capability to employ URW 
is completely different because it spans all instruments of power, hard and soft.  The previous 
analysis revealed some factors that may hinder an effective US response.  First, there are legal 
constraints such as the adherence to the Laws of Armed Conflict and Just War doctrine.121 
Second, the need for popular support will limit the scope of the response, especially if there are 
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no vital interests at stake and if the response involves the expenditure of blood and treasure.  
Furthermore, at the political level, the current focus on combating terrorism and the dire global 
economic situation deflect political attention from a holistic peer competitor.   
Therefore, within such constraints but considering the unique attributes and the strategic 
implications of the URW concept, this study highlights the importance of the coherent 
integration of the US’s national security strategy.  The size, complexity, responsibilities, and 
resource competition of the American strategic decision-making process are beyond the scope of 
this study. Nonetheless, this analysis has distilled several recommendations that should be 
incorporated in the US’s grand strategy.  This involves a three step approach based on renewed 
strategic thought, a holistic-agency approach, and a people-centric perspective.     
The first recommendation concerns the need for renewed strategic thought.  This perspective 
is informed with the mindset that, “With a good strategy, even the weak can succeed; with a 
weak strategy, even the strong will struggle.”122  Therefore, expanding the strategic perspective 
beyond the war on terrorism and acknowledging other threats will be the first step.  
Concentrating too much time, attention, resources, and engagement into one particular area of 
the conflict spectrum exposes vulnerabilities in other areas, such as the rise of future peer 
competitors.123  URW theory has shown the importance of the non-military dimension in 
warfare, thus requiring a shift of the traditional American approach to war.   
The second recommendation regards institutional culture.  The prospect of URW demands a 
‘purposeful adaptation’ of the interagency system.124  Such adaptation normally happens as the 
result of tragic events with impact to national security.  Although change is a phased approach, 
starting during peacetime, it requires a major violent event to decisively change the way to do 
business.125  That was the case for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, along 
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with a myriad of strategic guidance.  Currently, the expansion of warfare beyond the military 
domain creates additional demands for a holistic approach to national strategy.  That includes the 
national instruments of power as well as the influence over international organizations. 
The perception that the US lacked a coherent grand strategy regarding its counter terrorism 
action after 9/11 is well exposed in the literature.126  Although American power and influence is 
pervasive and multidimensional, the challenge of strategic integration, that is, bringing the 
instruments of power into coherent effectiveness through the use of the interagency process, still 
remains.127  Several factors may explain this symptom.  Historic reliance on the military tool as 
the strategic solution to conflicts has channelized resources into the Department of Defense.128 
Additionally, the lack of unity of command throughout the interagency process has compounded 
the problem.129  Furthermore, the blurring of domains and the effects of non-military actions add 
complexity to the coordination of a coherent response.  Finally, a holistic capability requires an 
integrated national strategic guidance. Yet, the proliferation of strategic guidance along with the 
increasing complexity of unaligned processes and ad hoc solutions, hinder the integration and 
synchronization of efforts.130  However, in defense of the status quo it must be said that, 
although concentration of power and authority may work well during time of crisis, during peace 
time this concentration creates a tension between government institutions and the society.  
Moreover, even though centralization of power may be the hallmark of an authoritarian state, it 
goes against the very nature of a liberal democracy like the US.  Therefore, the US’s society may 
be willing to accept some inefficiency in order to avoid a concentration of power in one 
government institution.   
Nonetheless, the inability to think strategically beyond the West’s concepts of warfare will 
be a major disadvantage for the US.  The main focus should not be the existing threats, but the 
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emerging ones.  That’s when strategic planning comes into play.  Crafting a response which is 
enforced and sustained by all national security actors is the main purpose.  After all, the dilemma 
in strategic affairs is always to balance the capabilities with the short and long-term 
requirements.  This means that the first step should be to provide the strategic guidance to allow 
the integration of the instruments of power and influence, creating an important security 
multiplier.131  Such efforts must address both military and civilian organizations, national and 
international institutions, public and private.  The release of a new National Security Strategy 
along with a new Quadrennial Defense Review in 2009 will constitute valuable opportunities to 
address the growing debate concerning the reform of the US government’s national security 
system.132  Moreover, considering the previous discussion and the need to extend the strategic 
vision beyond the military domain, the US’s grand strategy should include the implementation of 
a Quadrennial National Security Review. This tool would serve the purpose of aligning the 
efforts of all instruments of power, providing a common language and perspective about the 
future challenges. 
The final recommendation concerns the need to move from a technology-centric perspective 
to a people-centric approach based on education.  Strategic education will have two main 
functions. First, educate the strategist about different strategic cultures in order to promote the 
understanding of the cultural behaviors and anticipate opportunities and motives for action.  
Second, the education of the national security actors should focus on their ability to manage 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk in order to cope with the complex, but fundamental, holistic 
interagency approach. Improving the non-military pillar of national power is one of the lessons 
learned from current conflicts which should be helpful when dealing with URW threats.  The 
need for unity of effort and command provides the motive for change.  However, this requires an 
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effective interagency approach as well as a cross-manning of such agencies.  Hence, education 
by itself is not enough.  Changing institutional culture is a phased incremental phenomenon.133 
The acceptance of a new idea depends on the recognition of its merits, sometimes only possible 
after the perceived failure of old ways of doing business.  Further acceptance can be achieved if 
influential opinion makers sponsor this new idea.  Adopting new frameworks requires the 
support of the civilian and military leadership and the establishment of tangible incentives for 
change. Those incentives need to reward desirable behaviors such as cross-agency collaboration 
and service, thus promoting an interagency ethos.  The process can be expedited by 
institutionalizing change through mandate, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, but this 
time expanding beyond the military domain.  This legislative framework would encourage the 
development of national security professionals, military and civilians, “whose purpose would be 
to staff key positions in the national security structures.”134  Understanding the diverse cultures, 
functions, capabilities, and limitations of the actors in the interagency process will promote 
increased unity of effort and a more effective orchestration of the instruments of national power. 
Future warfare will increase the need for creative strategic thinking.  Developing a broad 
strategic understanding of the military role, but above all, understanding the importance of a 
holistic approach to war is something that the military leaders of tomorrow cannot afford to 
miss.135  Using the past as a prologue, it’s possible to envision a preeminent future where success 
is predicted by “those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who 
wait to adapt themselves after the change occurs.”136 
Conclusion 
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As this study has tried to demonstrate, there is more to war than warfare.137  War, as politic 
object, expresses a state of conflict, which encompasses the use of all instruments of national 
power, where military power is just one available tool.  Second, viewing warfare from its binary 
perspective, objective and subjective, it is possible to envision a historical trend about warfare.138 
The objective nature of warfare, which includes violence, friction, danger, exertion, chance, and 
uncertainty, is unchangeable. Conversely, the subjective character, its grammar, such as 
doctrine, technology, or people, changes along with the context.  Finally, every age has its own 
form of warfare, its own limiting conditions, and preconceptions.139  Confronting this Western 
framework with URW unveils the need to start learning the new grammar of future warfare. 
Globalization, the technological interconnectedness of societies, and America’s military 
prowess have created the opportunity and necessity for future peer competitors to exploit URW 
strategies. Although there is no single, all encompassing warfare theory that can be applicable to 
all possible futures, viewing conflict in a holistic manner provides windows of vulnerability that 
can be exploited by a future US challenger. URW renews the emphasis on the art of war and its 
decisive element, the human factor.  Technology is just another enabler, and military power just 
one instrument in a multidimensional domain.  The analysis about the dynamics and principles of 
URW has shown its strengths, but also its challenges. Although difficult to apply in a holistic 
manner, the evidence suggests that the URW concepts are widely understood and applied. 
This study has identified several challenges to US national security.  They all reveal the 
imperative for a broader strategic view about URW, and the ‘purposeful adaptation’ of the 
interagency process along with the education of the national security practitioners.  Rather than 
providing definite answers, this study has tried to question the status quo and expand the 
discussion ‘beyond-the-box’ of conventional military thinking about warfare.  By doing this it 
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aimed to promote future reflections about URW.  Many questions are left unanswered thus 
requiring further investigation. For example, what constitutes a legitimate target?  What should 
be the criteria to determine a response?  Further, what are the indications of an impending 
attack?  If society does not learn to live with risks, then the lack of answers only increases the 
probability of a state adopting preventive response strategies. 
In the future, it is the ability to impose will, not the level of violence, which will eventually 
lead to a better peace. The future journey is a complex endeavor indeed; however, so are the 
consequences of Unrestricted Warfare.   
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Appendix 1 
Unrestricted Warfare Methods 
The methods of warfare envisioned by the original URW proponents include a variety of 
forms of coercion which expands beyond the traditional military domain.140  While using this 
framework as a reference, this appendix will draw evidence from other authors seeking to gather 
additional support about possible challenges to US’s national security.  The list is not all-
inclusive and the boundaries between each method are not perfectly defined.  Although their 
strength lies on the synergistic employment of a combination of methods, the individual 
description of these methods along with examples of its implementation will enhance the 
understanding of URW strategy. 
Military Dimension 
Atomic Warfare. The proliferation of states seeking nuclear weapons as a form of 
deterrence and preeminence in regional and global spheres will create a renovated nuclear arms 
race. For example, the prospect of a nuclear Iran increases the regional security dilemma 
possibly leading to further nuclear escalation.  History has shown that nuclear deterrence didn’t 
preclude the existence of wars. However, it has tended to limit the expansion of conflicts.  
Nonetheless, the diffusion of technology and expertise indicates the possibility of expansion of 
the nuclear club with significant geopolitical changes.  In 2008, eight declared nuclear weapon 
states possessed 10,200 nuclear weapons.141  Further questions are raised about the ability of 
weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.142 
Conventional Warfare.  This method reflects the application of traditional military 
capabilities primarily against the adversary’s armed forces.  The trend towards precision, 
lethality, and speed allows tailored application of combat power.  The perspective that modern 
conventional warfare is declining between advanced societies results from its effectiveness.  
Additionally, the increasing costs of modern conventional armed forces when compared with 
other methods along with nuclear deterrence may contribute to the decreasing effect.  Moreover, 
the scale and quantity of resources involved in conventional warfare will tend to decrease due to 
the sophistication and complexity of operations.143  Finally, the historical examples of combat 
effectiveness of conventional forces against other forms of fighting may shift the emphasis of 
nation-states towards unconventional methods. 
Bio-chemical Warfare. This method includes the employment of living organisms or 
chemical substances to kill or incapacitate.  Although the Geneva Convention prohibits a nation-
state from using bio-chemical weapons it is not enough to prevent against its hostile use.  
Developing an infectious agent and then dispersing it in the adversary’s territory has the potential 
to cause a social and economical catastrophe.  The examples of anthrax released in Washington 
DC in 2001 or the use of chlorine by insurgents in Iraq in 2007 increases the requirement for bio­
containment and bio-security.144 
Ecological Warfare. Engaging in warfare has always had ecological implications.  
Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the difference between an accident, the manipulation of a 
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disaster, or a deliberate action which may produce an ecological catastrophe.  Burning a forest, 
causing an oil field fire, or contaminating fresh water reservoirs, may physically harm and inflict 
serious economic and ecological damages on a country.  Additionally, the introduction of 
genetically altered species into different areas may cause ecosystems to collapse.  Several 
examples of ecological warfare can be found in history.  The use of herbicides in Vietnam, the 
burning of oil wells in Kuwait, the deliberate release of oil into the Persian Gulf, and the use of 
radioactive materials all have produced long-term deleterious effects that are difficult to 
quantify. In the future, being able to influence natural phenomena such as earthquakes, 
precipitation patterns, or sea level height may provide further methods to affect the adversary. 
Space Warfare. Until recently, access to space has been restricted to a very few.  However, 
the availability and affordability of commercial technologies and the advent of the internet have 
allowed the diffusion of space capabilities.  Satellite imagery, communications, global precision 
navigation, and other services, act as capability multipliers providing additional leverage to 
civilians and military professionals.  Besides additional intelligence and weapons accuracy, these 
space capabilities coupled with low-end computers and cell phones, allow any adversary to 
establish a robust command, control, and communication infrastructure which is difficult to 
counter.145  Therefore, an emerging peer competitor will attempt to deny US’s access to space, 
severely crippling the effectiveness of military and civilian operations.      
Electronic Warfare. According with US doctrine, electronic warfare includes the military 
actions involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum or to attack the enemy.146  Military operations are increasingly dependent on the use of 
information systems and rely on the free access to the cyberspace.  While it is impossible to 
achieve supremacy in the cyberspace domain there is a strategic requirement to deny the 
adversary’s freedom of action in such domain.  Therefore, it is necessary to integrate electronic 
warfare actions with computer network operations in a broader perspective of Information 
Operations. However, other nations have different perspectives about the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Russia and China are some of the countries which are developing 
innovative forms to challenge US information superiority.147 
Guerrilla Warfare. One of the oldest forms of asymmetrical warfare is doctrinally defined 
as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, 
predominantly indigenous forces.148  In addition, the availability of information technology and 
global media allows modern guerrillas to achieve strategic effects.  Likewise, global 
interconnectedness offers the capability to establish international networks and decentralized 
structures. The insurgency movement in Iraq and Afghanistan translates the nature of this 
method of warfare.       
Terrorist Warfare. Combining the use of ‘new concepts of weapons’ with traditional 
terrorism causes the emergence of a new terror era, pushing the fear threshold to new levels.  
Such examples include the use of weapons of mass destruction, like dirty bombs or biological 
elements.  However, similar damage may be inflicted by attacking information systems, causing 
the disruption of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants or air traffic services.  The 
examples of the 9/11, the anthrax attack in 2001, and the Sarin gas attacks in Tokyo’s subway in 
1995 emulate this new kind of terrorist warfare. 
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Trans-military Dimension 
Diplomatic Warfare. In a predicted resource scarce and multipolar world, the capability to 
establish a network of regional and global alliances is essential to seize national interests.  This is 
the traditional ‘soft’ instrument of power that every state wields in the international system.  
While the Soviets tried to control proxies during the Cold War, nowadays China provides the 
proxies with resources to be used as they see fit.149  Additionally, the creation of large regional 
organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allows concerted decisions which 
leverage the power of a single country. As an example of this transformational power consider 
the conditions imposed by NATO or the EU on states wanting to become new members of these 
alliances. 
Network Warfare. This research has identified the importance of targeting the information 
systems and critical civilian infrastructures as an URW method to challenge the US.  Besides the 
network attacks aiming to probe, disrupt, or deny services, stealing vital information such as 
intellectual property has severe consequences and economic impact.  According to McAffee, in 
2008, surveyed companies lost more than $559 million worth of intellectual property.150  Based 
on those findings, McAfee estimates that the total global damage from data loss was more than 
$1 trillion.151 Considering the global economic crisis along with the pressures to reduce 
spending and staffing, it is possible to foresee additional opportunities for cybercriminals to 
create a “perfect information security storm.”152  The emergence of peer competitors will create 
additional pressures to ‘appropriate’ intellectual property in order to maintain economic 
growth.153 
Intelligence Warfare. The quest for perfect intelligence doesn’t guarantee success in war 
or complete security in peace time.  Being able to interpret and timely act upon the available 
intelligence is much more effective.  However, intelligence can be contradictory, partial, 
secretive, overly abundant, and sometimes commonly misinterpreted.  The examples of 9/11, the 
hunt for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction or the search for Bin Laden expose the limitations of 
intelligence.  The advent of open source intelligence (from which the internet is the main source) 
provides an asymmetrical intelligence warfare capability to any competitor.  Examples of such 
open source intelligence range from tips on how to construct improvised explosives devices, to 
satellite views of the target area available in Google Earth, or the training provided in chat 
rooms.  This capability of information sharing, collaboration, and networking is one of the 
fundamental challenges for the intelligence community.   
Psychological Warfare. Using information as propaganda to influence the adversary’s 
decision making process is a basic instrument of warfare.  It can be used as a coercive instrument 
which affects their will to fight. Recent conflicts in Iraq and Gaza have shown the importance of 
manipulating the adversary’s minds.  Russia and China are also exploring nontraditional, 
asymmetric approaches, respectively referred as ‘psychotronic war’ and ‘new concept 
weapons.’154  Their efforts are to utilize psychological operations to control the mind and affect 
the nervous system, upsetting human data-processing capabilities.  
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Smuggling Warfare. The use of illegal and counterfeit products and the establishment of a 
parallel underground economy impair the adversary’s traditional economy.  In some nations, the 
volume of black market commerce exceeds the value of the traditional economy.  Additionally, 
the fact that several states and organizations are trying to illegally acquire US military 
technology, if successful, allows potential adversaries to undermine the US’s technological 
advantage and national security.155 
Drug Warfare. Illegal drug production and trafficking supports organized political 
violence and challenges international stability.156  This method provides a huge influx of funds to 
sustain violent individuals, organizations, and states.  On the other hand, it affects the 
sustainability of the target state’s society, especially amongst youth, promoting crime escalation 
and in most severe cases directly affecting the political stability of the country.  Furthermore, it 
drains resources from the target state towards fighting drug production and trade routes.  
Afghanistan, Mexico, and Colombia provide some of the examples of the domestic, regional, and 
global instability of drug warfare. 
Non-military Dimension 
Financial Warfare. In a networked economic environment the flow of electronic money 
can be disrupted causing serious damages to the economy.  Financial warfare has become a 
‘hyperstrategic’ weapon because is easily manipulated, allows concealed actions, and it’s highly 
destructive.157  Moreover, it can be employed in a more targeted fashion, either by countries or 
super-empowered individuals.  This strategy has been increasingly used by the US to punish and 
shape behaviors.158  Additionally, individuals sometimes seek to obtain maximum profit, such as 
the currency manipulation by an international financier or hackers trying to breach banking 
accounts. The financial system, which relies on massive transactions of money and credit, is 
highly dependent on confidence and trust.  Therefore, the disruption of the financial foundations 
(i.e. the network in which the transactions heavily rely upon), may severely damage the system 
effectiveness, possibly collapsing the monetary transactions of a country and spreading severe 
economic and political consequences.159  Paul Bracken envisions financial warfare in an 
escalation framework.160  The process begins initially targeting individuals and companies by 
seizing their assets and then, expanding the measures to society, forcing a change of political 
behavior. Considering the US’s vulnerabilities, although defensive measures are being put in 
place to protect the networks, there are several interdependencies which can be targeted with 
severe consequences to the operation of the financial systems.  For example, the dependency on 
electrical and communication grids makes them a profitable target.161 
Trade Warfare. This method includes all the legal tools which can impose domestic and 
international trade restrictions.  Using sanctions, embargoes, trading cartels, or tariff barriers 
allows a country, or a group of nations, to cripple the targeted state by restricting goods, from oil 
to critical wartime technologies, or by imposing limitations to its exports.  This instrument can 
damage the economy of the target state if the state is heavily dependent on these products and if 
there is no alternative methods to obtain such resources.  In reality, the impact of such measures 
is often reduced due to the lack of restriction enforcement capabilities and also the country’s 
resilience and innovative work around solutions.  Moreover, the suffering is mostly imposed on 
the population and can sometimes backfire and unite them against the aggressor. 
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Resources Warfare. The resulting pressure from economic and population growth will 
affect how states procure and secure energy, food, and water resources.  The dependency on oil, 
either as a consumer or as a producer, will continue to shape global geopolitics creating 
additional flashpoints for conflict.  While today 600 million people from 21 countries are 
classified as cropland or freshwater scarce, by 2025 that number is projected to double.162  The 
efforts to secure energy resources led China to establish a network of alliances either by 
providing economic aid or by directly acquiring companies in several African and South 
American states.  Moreover, the concerns for maritime security are prompting China and India to 
buildup naval capabilities.163 
Economic Aid Warfare. International aid can be employed as an instrument to induce and 
shape an adversary’s behavior. It can involve simple humanitarian help or more extensive 
financial bailout packages. For example, as the biggest foreign holder of US government debt, 
China may leverage its position to constrain the behavior of the US.  The economic leverage can 
be used also to limit the US’s access to strategic regions.  For example, in 2009 Kyrgyzstan 
announced that it would cancel the US lease of an air base after Russia agreed to provide 
Kyrgyzstan $2 billion in loans and $150 million in financial aid.164 
Regulatory Warfare. The overall objective is to create a favorable legal framework which 
supports national interests. For example, China has attempted to shape international opinion 
regarding the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, defending 
an increased sovereign authority out to the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, the 
airspace above it, and possibly even outer space.165  Likewise, democratic states are constrained 
by a variety of laws, particularly regarding human rights, which can be used by other states or 
organizations to improve their combat effectiveness.   
Media Warfare. The advent of the Internet and global media allows any contender to 
influence perceptions and shape outcomes in order to obtain domestic and international support 
for their cause.  In the midst of an information tsunami it is often difficult to determine the 
credibility of an information source.  Multiple sources with different ideological, strategic, and 
commercial agendas increase the difficulty of operating within this environment.  Using words 
and images as weapons, every competitor relies on the media to disseminate massive 
disinformation.  Images and contents are manipulated, sometimes even fabricated in order to 
cause the maximum effect.  Once they are released it is difficult to correct the initial public 
perception. For example, the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah highlighted the 
importance of media manipulation.  During several CNN reports in Lebanon, Hezbollah 
maintained constant supervision of reporters work, dictating certain camera shots while 
forbidding others.166 
Ideological Warfare. Besides the traditional ideological conflicts within the Muslim world, 
the East and West different perspectives, or the democratic versus authoritarian states conflicts, 
the prospect of emerging nationalism due to economic crisis or resource scarcity may create 
additional threats to global security.  Fueling these grievances to destabilize a region provides a 
powerful political and military tool. 
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